How will you trade?

How will you trade? Fundamental traders base their trades on information external to the market. In other words, thing like; weather, strength of the dollar, cattle-on-feed reports, slaughter count, political events, etc. Technical traders base their trades on information internal to the market. Things like; chart patterns including trendlines, channels, waves, double tops and bottoms, etc. Also considered are stochastics, moving averages and the like. I’m not sure who makes the most money (that has been debated forever), but I think it is difficult to be 100% one or the other now days. There are others who do quite well using Astrology, Numerology, and just plain “gut feel”. In any case… Choose your weapon, the battle is about to begin.

source: irfutures.com

Growth Stocks Strategy: Indosat

Indosat: Neutral Market Perception 2008; Read carefully and be smart investor

Indosat with Neutral Market Perception

London Sumatera Indonesia Plantation: Excellent Value Manager

PERDANA WAHYU SANTOSA
Chief Knowledge Officer CAPITAL PRICE

Artikel ini pernah dimuat di Harian Bisnis Indonesia hal F2 dan menjadi materi Talk Show di PAS FM 92.4 Mhz pada Senin, 16 Februari 2009.

PROFIL EMITEN

Pada tahun 1906, Harrison & Crossfield Plc mendirikan PT. London Sumatera Indonesia Plantation, Tbk (LSIP), sebuah perusahaan perkebunan dan perdagangan yang berbasis di London dan tercatat di BEI tahun 1996. LSIP bergerak di bidang industri perkebunan kelapa sawit, karet, kakao, kelapa, teh dan kopi, serta mengolah hasil perkebunan dan memasarkan produknya, dengan proporsi lokal dan ekspor masing-masing sebesar 67% dan 33% (2007: 70% dan 30%).

LSIP memiliki 20 pabrik kelapa sawit (PKS) tersebar di seluruh Indonesia yang mencakup kapasitas proses sebesar 360 ton per jamnya. Kapasistas Penggunaan PKS mencapai 60% di Sumatra Utara melebihi 55% di Sumatra Selatan yang mempengaruhi pembelanjaan modal LSIP sampai 30 September 2008 untuk tanaman sebesar Rp. 269 miliar yang terdiri dari: penanaman kelapa sawit (5.037 Ha), penanaman karet (1.501 Ha), akuisisi lahan (5.807 Ha) dan bukan tanaman sekitar Rp 270 miliar.

Kemudian, pada 28 Mei 2007, Indofood Agri Resources Ltd (Grup IndoAgri) yang merupakan anak perusahaan PT Indofood Sukses Makmur (INDF) mengakuisisi 64,4% saham LSIP. Grup IndoAgri sendiri merupakan perusahaan perkebunan yang terintegrasi pada minyak goreng, margarin dan shortenings dengan merek terkemuka. Sebelumya, pada 31 Maret 2007, Grup IndoAgri memiliki lahan perkebunan sekitar 224.083 Ha, diantaranya sekitar 74.878 Ha telah ditanami kelapa sawit dengan jaringan pemasaran seluruh Indonesia dan luar negeri meliputi: Asia, Eropa, dan Amerika.

PROFIL SEKTOR

Sektor perkebunan sawit dan karet yang digeluti LSIP penuh dengan persaingan terutama pada saat harga CPO anjlok seperti saat ini akibat krisis ekonomi global. Beberapa pemain perkebunan sekaligus emiten di BEI seperti AALI, SGRO, UNSP dan TBLA juga beroperasi pada pasar yang relatif sama.

Perluasan area perkebunan dan efisiensi biaya produksi menjadi kunci suksesnya LSIP menghadapi pesaing-pesaing potensialnya. Posisi penantang (chalenger) dalam struktur pasar harus dapat dipertahankan melalui strategi yang tepat namun fleksibel dalam menghadapi perubahan ekonomi yang cepat dan tak terduga.

Adanya penerapan program sertifikasi dari pembeli dari Eropa akan meningkatkan prospek sektor perkebunan ini. Mengingat Indonesia sebagai salah satu produsen CPO terbesar di dunia akan memiliki daya tawar yang lebih baik lagi melalui produk CPO bersertifikat.

HIGHLIGHT 2002-2009

Kenaikan harga minyak mentah dunia pada 2007 mendongkrak sektor komoditas, termasuk crude palm oil (CPO) dan harga saham LSIP melonjak ke level Rp 12.000 an namun dengan adanya krisis ekonomi ini menjadi Rp 3.600 pada penutupan perdagangan 11 Februari 2009. Sepanjang tahun 2002-2008, perusahaan meningkatkan sales dengan CAGR sebesar 21,45% dan profitabilitas LSIP meningkat dengan CAGR 24,87% untuk operating profit dan hanya 2,42% untuk net income.

Pertumbuhan rata-rata tahunan Total Equity mencapai 66,93% dan Total Assets 18,49%. Hal ini menunjukan pertumbuhan Net Income yang rendah dan tidak proporsional dibanding growth sales-nya karena adanya biaya kurang efisien dan cost of capital yang tinggi. Sepanjang tahun 2002-2007, Return on Equity (ROE) cukup fluktuatif sebesar 24,36%, Cost of Capital (COC) meningkat pada level tertinggi sebesar 15,05%, Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) berfluktuasi 14,77% dan Economic Value Added (EVA) pada level tertinggi sebesar 34,47%.

Penurunan DAR ini berpotensi menurunkan beban keuangan dan resiko jangka panjang LSIP terhadap cost of capital sehingga profitabilitasnya akan tumbuh dengan baik. LSIP mempunyai saldo laba bersih posisi 30-09-2008 sebesar Rp. 1,503 triliun dan Total Assset hingga Rp. 4,7 triliun. Pengunaan saldo laba bersih untuk buy back sekitar Rp. 728 miliar dan tidak akan menyebabkan kekayaan bersih perseroan menjadi lebih kecil dari jumlah modal disetor (paid in capital) ditambah cadangan wajib yang telah disisihkan.

Market Value Added (MVA) dan MARKET RISK

Kinerja saham LSIP meningkat sepanjang April 2003-April 2008 yang diiringi dengan fluktuasi pada shareholder Market Value Added (MVA) terhadap equity Book Value (BV) hingga mencapai 374,50%. Rata-rata return (annualized) saham perusahaan juga berfluktuasi hingga mencapai 48,73% di bulan April 2008.

Namun, Market Risk yang merupakan ukuran fluktuasi harga saham relatif terhadap fluktuasi keseluruhan pasar IHSG bergerak pada level 1 hingga 1,3. Sementara tingkat volatilitas harga saham perusahaan bergerak stabil pada level 40% sejak April 2005.

MARKET PERCEPTION MAP 2008

Selain mempertimbangkan kondisi makroekonomi, mikroekonomi, dan analisis fundamendal keuangan (seperti PER, PBV, EPS, ROE, NPM, DCFA), dan rasio-rasio lainnya ternyata terdapat faktor penting lainnya dalam proses pengambilan keputusan investasi yaitu persepsi pasar (market perception) terhadap emiten itu sendiri.

Market Perception merupakan konsensus pasar sebagai hasil analisis para investor terhadap kinerja keuangan saat ini dan peluang bisnis emiten di masa depan dan kredibilitas manajemen yang berpotensi besar dalam pembentukan dan pergerakan harga saham. Tim riset CAPITAL PRICE meng-‘kuantifikasi’ unsur kualitatif yang melekat dari persepsi pasar tersebut menjadi sebuah market perception map yang mudah dipahami

Market Perception map 2008 memvisualisasikan posisi perusahaan LSIP melalui CP (current performance) index dan FGO (future growth opportunity) index relatif terhadap perusahaan-perusahaan lain pada tahun 2008. Manajemen LSIP juga dinilai cukup kredibel oleh pasar terlebih pascaakuisisi oleh INDF. Pangsa pasar domestik LSIP semakin terbuka karena kemampuan penetrasi yang lebih baik lagi akibat bersinergi dengan jaringan distribusi INDF yang kuat.

Penilaian pasar terhadap profitabilitas LSIP dalam jangka pendek (CP) tahun 2008 di atas rata-rata emiten-emiten lainnya, karena penurunan harga CPO dinilai temporari saja. Sedangkan ekspektasi pasar terhadap prospek pertumbuhan bisnis LSIP di masa depan (FGO) berada di atas rata-rata perusahaan lainnya. Kesimpulan CAPITAL PRICE terhadap LSIP adalah Excellent Value Manager sebagai persepsi pasar yang baik terhadap emiten perkebunan ini.

AKSI KORPORASI

LSIP melakukan buy back pada dua transaksi yang berbeda; transaksi pertama pada 13 November 2008 lalu membeli 377.500 saham dengan harga Rp. 2.142,17 per saham dan mengeluarkan dana sebesar Rp.801,87 juta, dibantu oleh Indopremier Securities, yang bertindak sebagai pelaksana buy back.
Sementara aksi buy back kedua LSIP pada 16 November 2008 dalam keterbukaan informasi di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) dengan jumlah saham yang dibeli LSIP sebanyak 2.768.000 saham yang dibeli dengan harga Rp 2.251,31 per saham. LSIP telah menggunakan dana sebesar Rp 6,23 miliar, sehingga total saham yang dibeli sebesar 3.145.500 saham dengan nilai transaksi Rp 7,03 miliar dan menganggarkan dana sebesar Rp. 627,7 miliar untuk buy back saham, di mana jumlah maksimal saham yang bakal di buy back sebanyak 20%.

LSIP juga mengakusisi sekaligus tiga perusahaan kelapa sawit yaitu Tani Musi Persada (20.000 Ha), Tani Andalas Persada (10.000 Ha) dan Sumatra Agri Sejahtera (16,000) senilai Rp. 48 milyar . Pada tahun 2008, LSIP juga mengalokasikan dana US$ 100 juta untuk membiayai ekspansi seperti pembangunan pabrik kelapa sawit di sejumlah lokasi perkebunannya. Disamping itu, LSIP juga berencana mengembangkan lahan sawit di Sumatra Selatan hingga 46.000 Ha. Pada tahun 2009 LSIP menargetkan pertumbuhan produksi Crude Palm Oil (CPO) meningkat sebesar 10% dari realisasi tahun sebelumnya. Pencapaian produksi tersebut dilakukan dengan mengacu kriteria yang ditetapkan dalam Roundtable for Suistainable Palm Oil (RSPO) atau lebih dikenal dengan minyak sawit lestari.

Berdasarkan strategi yang dilakukan, diharapkan lima tahun ke depan, LSIP memperoleh dua keuntungan, yakni: harga jual CPO yang tinggi dan biaya produksi yang efisien dibanding perusahaan lainnya. Rencana pengambilalihan dapat memperkuat bisnis model perkebunan Grup IndoAgri, antara lain: mengembangkan usaha inti perkebunan, memperluas lahan dan perkebunan yang telah ditanami dengan kelapa sawit, meningkatkan produksi, memenuhi kebutuhan internal untuk CPO dan menjadi produsen atas bibit kelapa sawit unggul.

Realisasi rencana jangka panjang Grup IndoAgri memiliki 250.000 Ha perkebunan kelapa sawit. Total lahan perkebunan dan total lahan yang telah ditanami kelapa sawit meningkat sekitar 387.483 Ha dan 138.081 Ha. Secara keseluruhan luas lahan yang telah ditanami sekitar 165.000 Ha termasuk tanaman karet dan tanaman lainnya.

Ditulis bersama YULIANTINA SOFIAN (Financial Research Analyst-CAPITAL PRICE)

Buffett’s worst year

Berkshire Hathaway reports a rough, down 2008, cheered up by preferred-stock investments Buffett likes.
By Carol Loomis, senior editor at large

NEW YORK (Fortune) — Berkshire Hathaway reported today that its net worth fell in 2008 by $11.5 billion, a decline reducing its per-share book value by 9.6%. That was Berkshire’s worst result in the 44 years that Chairman Warren Buffett has run the company and, in fact, only the second decline in that period. The other drop was 6.2% in 2001, a year hurt by 9/11 and other problems in Berkshire’s insurance operations.

Per-share book value changes are the customary way that Buffett reports the company’s results because this method incorporates all of Berkshire’s capital gains and losses whether they are realized or not. A large decline in the value of Berkshire’s stock holdings was indeed the central reason that Berkshire reported a down year.

Under the more commonly used yardstick, earnings (which do not reflect unrealized gains or losses), Berkshire reported profits of $3,224 per share for 2008 against $8,548 in 2007.

Berkshire’s profits stemmed mainly from interest and dividends on its investments and the earnings of its 70 operating subsidiaries. Berkshire has extensive holdings in two industries, insurance and utilities, whose earnings are not closely correlated with those of the general economy.

Even so, the total pretax earnings of all Berkshire’s operating businesses (not including insurance for this calculation) fell by a bit, from just over $4,000 per share to just under that figure. The decline reflected the sagging results of the many Berkshire operations that are being hurt by a sour economy, among them those in housing-related businesses (Johns Manville, Shaw Industries) and retail (including furniture, jewelry, and candy companies).

Berkshire’s (BRKA, Fortune 500) shares have taken a beating. The A stock dropped from $142,000 at yearend 2007 to $96,600 a year later, and in 2009 it has fallen further, closing at $78,600 yesterday. From its top of $151,000, hit in late 2007, the stock is down 48%.

In his chairman’s letter, Buffett states that 2008 had good points mixed in with the bad. But in an unusual admission for the opening pages of the letter (a point easily recognizable by this writer because she has edited Buffett’s letter for 32 years) he says bluntly, “During 2008 I did some dumb things in investments.”

The dumbest, he said, was buying a large amount of ConocoPhillips stock when oil prices were near their peak and in no way anticipating the dramatic drop in prices that subsequently occurred. Buffett said he still thinks the odds are good that oil will sell in the future at much higher prices than the $40 to $50 per barrel now prevailing. But even if prices should rise, he said, “the terrible timing” of the Conoco purchase has cost Berkshire several billion dollars.

Berkshire data show that the company entered 2008 with 17.5 million Conoco (COP, Fortune 500) shares and ended with nearly five times that many, 84.9 million shares. At yearend, when Conoco stock was about $52, Berkshire’s unrealized loss on all its shares (both those bought in 2008 and earlier) was $2.6 billion. But the stock closed yesterday at $37.40. If Berkshire still owns all its Conoco shares, the unrealized loss has grown to $3.8 billion.

That hammering may psychically bother Buffett the most — he detests making faulty judgments about stock prices — but Berkshire’s biggest financial blows in 2008 came from two of the company’s long-time holdings: The market value of Berkshire’s American Express (AXP, Fortune 500) shares fell by $5 billion, and its Coca-Cola (KO, Fortune 500) stake sank by $3 billion.

Berkshire’s huge position in Wells Fargo (WFC, Fortune 500) suffered very little in 2008, but has been hammered this year. The 304 million Wells shares that Berkshire owned at yearend 2008 have lost well over half their market value, falling from $9 billion to $3.65 billion. Berkshire’s stake in U.S. Bancorp (USB, Fortune 500) is down by around $800 million.

The good points about 2008 for Berkshire? Well, Buffett had been long looking for places to invest the company’s bulging granary of cash, and the tumbling prices in 2008 provided him opportunities (a word obviously not fitting the Conoco purchase). In the fall, inking a deal announced earlier in the year, he put $6.5 billion into Wm. Wrigley Co., by means of 11.45% subordinated notes (that was $4.4 billion of the investment) and preferred stock that pays a 5% dividend ($2.1 billion) and carries upside possibilities that have not been disclosed. The investments helped finance Mars Inc.’s purchase of Wrigley.

The preferred stock opportunities expanded after the financial world fell apart in September. On October 1, Berkshire bought $5 billion of Goldman Sachs preferred paying a 10% dividend and acquired warrants — exercisable for five years — to purchase 43.5 million common shares for $5 billion, a price per share of $115. Goldman has been well under that price most of the time since and closed yesterday at $91.

In a similar deal, carried out on October 16, Berkshire purchased $3 billion of General Electric 10% preferred and acquired warrants — again, good for five years — to buy 134.8 million common shares of GE for $3 billion, a price per share of $22.25. GE’s stock, weighed down by GE Capital (which, in loans, is effectively the fifth-largest bank in the nation), has been a general disaster since and closed yesterday at around $8.50.

To finance all those purchases, store up for a $5 billion acquisition of utility Constellation Energy that fell through, and keep Berkshire’s operations well supplied with cash, Buffett felt obliged, he said in his letter, to sell some portions of holdings that he would have preferred to keep. Principally, he said, the stocks sold were Procter & Gamble, Johnson & Johnson, and Conoco. Berkshire’s positions in all three were established in the last few years, though the P & G holding materialized when that company merged in 2005 with Gillette, whose stock Berkshire had owned since the early 1990s.

The paradox of Buffett’s investment year will be evident: To put Berkshire’s pile of cash to work at prices he considered attractive — “I like those preferreds,” he said recently — he had to endure a terrible stock market that savaged many of the stocks the company already held. He has always declared, though, that he is perfectly content to see Berkshire’s stocks fall in price, because that allows him to buy more of them cheaply.

CHANGES IN THE ANNUAL MEETING: Buffett also announced in his letter that new procedures will be used in the question periods at Berkshire’s annual meeting on May 3, in Omaha. Three journalists will collect questions e-mailed to them by shareholders; choose the most interesting and important; and ask them of Buffett and Berkshire vice chairman Charles Munger, neither of whom will have been told what the questions will be.

The questions the journalists select will be alternated with others asked directly by shareholders chosen by a drawing held the morning of the meeting. Previously, all questions were asked by sleep-deprived shareholders who lined up at the meeting arena until the doors were opened and then raced to microphones to establish a priority position. Buffett said in his letter that he had concluded “sprinting ability” was not a good determinant for who should get to ask questions.

The three journalists are the writer of this article, Carol Loomis of FORTUNE (who, as previously noted, has long edited Buffett’s annual report letter — without pay, by the way); Becky Quick of CNBC; and Andrew Ross Sorkin of The New York Times.